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Introduction 
 
There is nothing truer than myth: history in its attempt to realize myth, distorts it, 
stops halfway; when history claims to have succeeded, this is nothing but humbug and 
mystification.        Eugene Ionesco (1958) 
 
Myths at once seem inescapable and have to be escaped. The greatest threat of 
simplified and fact-distorting narratives, these public dreams ‘nourished by silence as well as 
words’ (Calvino 1989:19), is not the historical precision that they eliminate, but the ends that 
they justify. Rwanda’s history is a battle of counter-posed myths, which rationalized political 
regimes and excused the exclusion of segments of society from sharing equitably in rights, 
resources and decisions. Today, another mythologized narrative has developed, wearing a 
self-professedly ‘neutral’ and ‘moral’ garb; a nationalist history ostensibly enabling the 
dissolution of ethnicity and as such, reconciliation as ‘permanent solution’ to the ‘ethnicized’ 
conflict and its mass production of displacement.  
 
The current government’s new nation-building project of ‘de-ethnicization’ aims to 
replace ethnicity and other potentially ‘divisive’ sub-state loyalties with an undifferentiating 
‘rwandanness.’ De-ethnicization is composed of the narrative of ‘unity’ and ‘dissolubility of 
difference’, both rooted in a re-reading of the already much embattled history. The discursive 
frame of the project is ‘inclusive’, setting itself in opposition to previous nationalist myths 
aiming to ‘exclude’, but this merely obscures the top-down dissemination, tightly policed 
boundaries and totalitarian nature of the discourse. The present study investigates de-
ethnicization, the way in which it manifests itself through ingando (camps set up for political 
education of various groups), and finally, the way in which we should think about its 
effectiveness as a reconciliatory tool within the broader framework of transitional justice.  
 
The post-genocide returns to Rwanda brought together a population divided in new 
and complex ways. This study builds on the premise that in such a context, repatriation and 
reconciliation cannot be treated as separate. Where the former signifies ‘return’, the latter 
(amongst other things) determines its stability, the permanence of the ‘non-necessity to flee.’ 
But repatriation is implicated otherwise in the latter concept. Reconciliation as prevention of 
relapse into conflict cannot be effectively pursued if one does not understand how profoundly 
massive return reconfigures social realities and thus grievances that underlie conflict.  
 
De-ethnicization attempts to further such a project of ‘stability’ although, as will be 
shown, it might not ultimately serve this goal best. In what appears a distinctly modernist 
urge, the Rwandan government sets out to re-engineer national identity in order to ‘re-root’ 
the sense of belonging and forge ‘social cohesion.’ To this end, it has elaborated not only a 
new mythology but a whole machinery of its dissemination comprising lectures, 
‘discussions’, commemorations, television and radio programmes, and a variety of 
‘traditional’ ‘reconciliatory’ activities.  
 
Ingando camp is one such ‘traditional’, ‘reconcialiatory’ tool, a space where the 
contours and rules of ‘new Rwanda’ are imparted to participants. Ingando has been little 
studied despite seeming to be an important disseminator of the new ‘mythico-history’ (Smith 
1986, Malkki 1995), especially so as history has not been taught in schools since the end of 
the genocide (Hodgkin 2006). Additionally, ingando is an ideal case study of the repatriation-
reconciliation nexus since it is a transition space both in the literal sense (for repatriates and 
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provisionally released prisoners before they join their communities) and in a more figurative 
one (ingando as a rite of passage between the outside and the inside represented by the new 
ideology). Although ingando has never drawn as wide a participation as the grassroots courts 
of gacaca,1 it has become increasingly popular in recent years, incorporating diverse 
segments of society in its ‘solidarity-building’ and ‘re-education’ activities. 
 
This study will show that the nationalist script of de-ethnicization, the purported glue 
which makes return stable and prevents conflict from recurring, is based on a simplistic 
binary opposition and remains weak for the same reason why it is intriguing: De-
ethnicization is a ‘minority’ project, promoted with a victor’s righteousness, forbidding and 
prescribing certain forms of expression and association, while not creating a concomitant 
attractor in the form of equal participation in state-building and ‘state-sharing’. At the same 
time, de-ethnicization appears to be an ‘imported’, ‘brewed-in-exile’ recipe for a permanent 
escape from the past and attainment of an alternative future. It represents a curious ‘re-
territorialization’ of a nation-building project conceived in exile. The roots of the imagining 
remain uniquely ‘post-Oriental’, traceable to diaspora scholars ‘who have finally made the 
long trek home’ (Pottier 2002:204). It is the interstitial/liminal (Rwandan refugees in 
Uganda) that overcomes ‘relations of dominance’ and comes to the centre (the physical space 
of homeland). But returning triumphant, it re-establishes dominance, ‘imposing’ its vision.  
 
In what follows, section one will briefly outline the importance of return migration in 
reconstituting the social landscape post-genocide and in that process it will challenge a 
simplistic notion of a ‘divided society.’ Section two will proceed to outline concepts central 
to the thesis. It will delineate the ‘repatriation-reconciliation nexus’, briefly explore the 
notion of reconciliation-cum-nation building, and will position the study vis-à-vis the 
literature on nationalism and ethnicity. Section three will in turn analyse de-ethnicization as a 
political project with roots, agents and scripts or myths, the central one being the script of 
‘unity’. Section four will investigate ingando as a space of dissemination. Ingando will be 
theorized as a re-invented tradition, a rite of passage aimed as re-education and physical, 
social and psychological transition from outside inside the ‘new Rwanda’. Section five will 
both critically assess the major factors that undermine de-ethnicization and propose an 
alternative that might avoid its costs.  
 
The final analysis will call for a careful incorporation of difference into the Rwandan 
project of national unity. Rather than opting for one of the dominant solutions such as 
majoritarian liberal democracy and consociationalism, or the fundamentally authoritarian 
attempt at de-ethnicization, the study motions towards a more nuanced understanding of 
‘post-genocide plurality’, which accommodates yet supersedes difference as an ordering 
principle in political interaction.  
 
1. Tracing Transition: Post-genocide Returns and a Complex Social Landscape 
In July 1994, after almost four years of intermittent warfare,2 the Rwanda Patriotic 
Front (RPF), composed mostly of Rwandan Tutsi exiles from Uganda, gained control of the 
capital, Kigali, and put an end to the genocide which had begun in April. They established a 
Government of National Unity and since then have dominated Rwanda’s political scene. The 
                                                 
1 Gacaca are community courts designed to hear cases stemming from the 1994 genocide. They claim to be 
inspired by traditional Rwandan justice. 
2 See Annex 1 for a detailed historical timeline. 
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first post-genocide democratic elections in October 2003 merely confirmed the RPF’s grasp 
on power through what was apparently a landslide but contested victory. While scholars 
rushed to disentangle the roots of the ultimate crime against humanity, the period that 
followed received relatively little attention.  
  
This section does not attempt to fully grasp the multifaceted transition. Instead, it 
focuses on return migration as one less studied phenomenon and outlines its central 
importance in both redefining the social landscape post-genocide and problematizing the 
notion of a ‘divided society of Hutus and Tutsis’.3  
 
Importance of Return Migration 
The Government of National Unity inherited not only a devastated but literally a 
‘displaced’ country, where much of the population had fled the RPF’s advance (Stockton 
1994; Reed 1996). Precise figures do not exist, but approximate counts remain instructive: 
Up to 1.5 million Hutu internally displaced4; 2 million mostly Hutu refugees abroad (‘new 
caseload’ refugees; Reyntjens 2004:15); and 0.5 million Tutsi returning immediately after the 
RPF take-over (‘old caseload’). Since 1994, about 2.1-3.4 million refugees5 have been 
repatriated and resettled, a ‘record in world history’ (Kaiza 2003). The result is that 25-40 
percent of the present population of 8.7 million (2006) is constituted by post-genocide 
returnees. In some areas, a third of the population is new and in two prefectures half of the 
inhabitants arrived recently (De Lame 2004:4).  
 
Rwanda represents a unique case study not only due to the scale and complexity of 
movement in a relatively brief period, but also because the victors of the war were themselves 
returning exiles. They were ‘old caseload’ refugees and their descendants, some 120,000-
300,000 Tutsi (mainly the elite) who fled Rwanda at the approach of independence (1959-61) 
and dispersed across all neighbouring countries and beyond (Pottier 2002:11). The ‘old 
caseload’ formed the kernel of what will henceforth be referred to as the ‘diaspora.’6 The 
numbers of the predominantly Tutsi diaspora grew both because return was forbidden or later 
effectively precluded7 and families expanded, and also because further reprisals, notably in 
the early 1970s, led to a continued outflow of Tutsis from Rwanda. The formation of the RPF 
in exile was the only way for refugees to return (Prunier 1998), by creating what Shain calls a 
‘revolutionary exile organization…aiming to overthrow the home regime and reconstruct the 
entire social order’ (1989:10). Immediately after the genocide ended, a large portion of the 
exiled Tutsi population returned to their country, ‘most discovering it for the first time’ 
(Reyntjens 2004:15) yet simultaneously ‘becoming the new elite responsible for 
reconstruction, reconciliation and rule of law’ (Pitsch-Santiago 2003:1). 
 
                                                 
3 The last available ethnically disaggregated population estimates suggest that Hutu comprise 85 percent, Tutsi 
about 14 percent, and the indigenous Twa less than one percent of the total population (Mgbako 2005:4). But 
are these ‘categorical frames’ sufficient in guiding our analysis of the new nation building project in Rwanda?  
4 Estimates as low as 0.5 million have been proposed. Some IDPs may have been double-counted as refugees. 
5 0.5-1.5 million IDPs in addition to 1.1 million ‘new caseload’ Hutu, and 0.5-0.8 ‘old caseload’ Tutsi. 
6 Most (90 percent) remained in Africa, mostly in Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania, but some have 
migrated to Belgium, France, USA and Canada (Prunier 1998:124). 
7 ‘Old caseload’ refugees did obtain the ‘right to return’ on two separate occasions. During the first republic 
(1962-1973), the offer was dismissed by refugees as ‘propaganda.’ During the second republic, in 1986, 
Habyarimana allowed return under especially draconian conditions. Returnees would not be able to recover lost 
property or possessions, and would be allocated places to live (STJE 1996).  
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Return to What? Rethinking ‘Divided Society’ 
Rwandans are charting a different course from other post-genocide societies (US 
Committee on Refugees 1998). With no claims to ‘breakaway’ statehood and no signs of ‘de-
facto ethnic separation’,8 ‘the basic [post-genocide] choice between “political union” and 
“political divorce”’ (Mamdani 2001:265) has been decided in favour of the former. By 
insisting that perpetrators and survivors can live ‘side by side’,9 Rwanda is said to constitute 
a ‘divided society.’ 
                                                
 
While the distinction between perpetrators and survivors is an analytically important 
one, we should avoid re-creating the simplistic image of Rwanda as a ‘bi-polar’ society. Such 
a conceptualization fails to capture i) the complex differences that have always cut across 
other lines; ii) the full diversity of genocide experience; and iii) the completely new 
reconfigurations resulting from mass returns. Today as in the past, Hutu are separated from 
other Hutu and Tutsi from other Tutsi by regional, lineage, clan and client affiliations, which 
developed previous to class and ‘ethnic’ distinctions (Newbury 2001, Vansina 2004). 
Discrimination under the two republics followed such ‘non-ethnic’ lines, taking the form of 
regional favouritism and sometimes simply nepotism. In addition, Rwanda’s diversity is 
reflected through the various experiences of genocide not only as victim or participant, but 
also as bystander, absentee or saviour (Buckley-Zistel 2006b:101). The post-genocide 
massive returns further complicate the social landscape (Bergman 2004:4) in ways that 
suggest tensions but are far from known and do not necessarily ‘cut along the familiar 
divides’ (Minow and Chayes 2003:40).  
 
Unfortunately, no academic study offers a satisfactory theory of ‘division’ in post-
genocide Rwanda, one that would translate the observed ‘complex orders of difference’ 
(Berman 1998) into predictions regarding conflict-prone cleavage. What are the deepest 
divisions or horizontal inequalities along which the greatest tensions do or might accumulate? 
While the aim here is not to theorize the persistence and depth of each likely ‘divider’ and its 
relative weight as a possible contributor to conflict resurgence, it is crucial to highlight the 
‘diversity of difference’ to discard simplistic assumptions of what ‘division’ means and hence 
what ‘coexistence’ requires, and to situate the often overlooked phenomenon of return as 
itself a powerful shaper of societal tensions. In fact, the study suggests that division which 
usually passes unnoticed and which cuts along one of these ‘unfamiliar lines’ is crucial in 
Rwanda today. The complicated and non-straightforward way in which a sub-set of ‘old-
caseload’ returnees might form one of the most important cleavages (as regards the prospects 
of the nation-building project) will become fully apparent by the end of this paper. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
‘Repatriation-Reconciliation Nexus’: From ‘Durability’ to ‘Stability’ of Return 
Besides being a well-established negotiation tool (Haas; Stein; McGinnis; in Betts 
2006:2), the exercise of issue linkage can have important impacts on institutional policy 
through what has been termed the power of ideas to alter perceptions of causal relationships 
(Betts 2006:2), and the ‘agenda-setting value’ and ‘mobilizing effects’ of key terms (Suhrke 
2003:102). By adopting an altered reference point, we can not only shift emphasis (Suhrke 
 
8 Cf. the former Yugoslavia, where mass killing and ethnic cleansing have produced both these outcomes.  
9 One important caveat to this is the government-established ‘villageization’ projects called imidugudu, which 
are composed of a single ethnic group.  
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2003:101) and creatively ‘re-imagine’, we can also enrich vital concepts. Arrival at the 
‘milieu’ or in-between place of the concepts of repatriation and reconciliation calls for 
rethinking of the discourse of ‘durability’ to better advocate not only against the withdrawal 
of agency and academic attention from refugee returnees but also for a more meaningful 
engagement with them. The concept of ‘stability’ of return offers a useful alternative; an 
inter-temporal tool able to dig deeper to the core of what causes (and thus what prevents) 
forced displacement.  
 
i. Return/Repatriation 
‘Since repatriations are, by definition, journeys “home”, it has been largely assumed 
that such movements are familiar and unproblematic’ (Pilkington and Flynn 1999:195). 
Repatriation implies a certain finality, a return to stability and normalcy (Warner 1992:71), a 
restoration of order-as-was, an equilibrium of yestertimes (Malkki 1992). Such a vision, 
however, denies ‘the temporary reality of our lives and the changes that take place over time’ 
(Warner 1994:171). It neglects the fact that repatriation might not mean a return to the 
economic, social, and cultural ‘status quo ante’ (Kibreab 2002:55), that what results is 
‘integration’ rather than ‘re-integration’ (ibid.:74), and that return in fact might not be a ‘re-
anything but the beginning of a new cycle’ (Black and Gent 2006:20). The most worrisome 
outcome of this stylized notion of return as a good thing, a re-emplacement of people to 
‘where they belong’, to a ‘place known in shorthand as home’ (Hammond 1999:227) is that 
‘attention to refugees might be abruptly and artificially ended at the point of repatriation. As a 
result, too little assistance is given to those who return and we know too little about the 
diverse experiences of returnees’ (Black and Gent 2006:20). 
 
Even when return leads to one’s encounter with the same location, this location for 
different reasons might cease to be the same ‘place’, ‘home’ or ‘patria.’ For one, it might 
carry different, often negative, associations as a result of conflict and forced flight (Rogge 
1994). The passing of time might change objective circumstances in the country or location 
of origin and make it ‘unfamiliar’, a ‘strange and threatening place’ especially for returnees 
born in exile (Kibreab 2002: 55; and also Rogge 1994; Malkki 1995; Hammond 2004). 
Encounters with other returnee groups might have similar effects. But exile and return are 
more than kinetic moments, political phenomena and geographic spaces. They are also spaces 
of experience and transformation of identity (Clifford 1994; Gilroy 1993; Matsuoka and 
Sorenson 2001). Exile can lead both to distanciation from homeland, and to longing and re-
imagining of home and nation. All of these factors determine the experience of return and 
integration, and also might signal a most complex transformation of conflict.  
 
Counting the diverse discontinuities of post-genocide return seems a herculean if not 
outright impossible task. But just remarking on the many ways in which return is not a simple 
coming home to ‘familiar’ ground is essential. It highlights that if return signifies the 
continuity of anything, it is first and foremost that of a state. Because while people settle into 
different spaces, while the ‘patria’ might be new and unfamiliar to most and even threatening 
to some, it survives as ‘Rwanda’, the only space where a people are a priori entitled to 
imagine and construct permanent ‘homes.’ If attention to refugees is withdrawn at the border, 
such complacency further ‘naturalizes’ the state as a continuous, stable and homely space. 
Yet rather than ‘stability’, return might signal a mere suppression of conflict within an 
ineffectual state (Duffield 2007).  
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ii. Reconciliation 
Reconciliation requires a brief exposé as it is both a highly used term and a vague 
concept (Zorbas 2004; Jenkins 2004). Reconciliation here is not to conjure the ‘sentimental 
and emotional meeting of hearts and minds’, ‘forgiving and forgetting’ (Ignatieff, in Minow 
and Chayes 2003:325) since these hardly can be expected or even willed on more than an 
individual scale in a deeply traumatized society (ibid.). Reconciliation might be more usefully 
conceptualized as the high end of the stability-of-peace spectrum, symptomized by 
coexistence and later collaboration, cooperation and finally integration between segments of 
society (Afzai and Colleton, in Minow and Chayes 2003:21). For these ‘symptoms’ to occur, 
both negative peace (absence of violence) and positive peace (long-term durable stability) 
need to be fostered through political, economic and security measures detailed elsewhere.  
 
iii. The Nexus 
The basic thesis informing the concept linkage in question asserts that where flight 
results from conflict, one cannot think of a ‘stable’ or ‘sustainable’ return without dealing 
with specific issues of negative peace, particularly human and communal security, and 
positive peace, both being necessary ingredients to reconciliation. Although organizations’ 
recent practice such as quick impact projects, cross mandates, the ‘4Rs agenda’10 show the 
understanding that that there is a gap between return and ‘durability’, that durability does not 
simply ensue as a result of return but has to be worked towards, there is no solid theoretical 
underpinning which would connect return to a lack of repeated flight.  
 
Vague intimations only are made in the direction of the nexus: UNHCR has for 
example ‘realized the importance of prevention of conflict and peace-building to protect and 
assist IDPs and refugees in areas of conflict’ (Suhrke 2003:102). Such a realization 
interestingly omits returnees and post-conflict states. Further, the discourse on return 
apparently shows the comprehension that ‘return is not enough to promote peace’ but that it 
has to be a ‘successful return’ (Black and Gent 2006). Yet causality between peace and return 
is not unidirectional: Prospects of peace are partly determined by return, success of return is 
determined by prospects of peace. The lack of a clear theoretical base connecting return with 
a possibility of future flight might explain both i) the agencies’ inability to fully integrate 
peace-building and reconciliation into their imaginative and thus operative universe; and ii) 
the fact that they might get embroiled in reconciliation exercises they little understand.  
 
‘Durability’ is a problematic notion, suggesting permanence. Yet the fact of return 
does not necessarily signal negative peace and certainly does not signal presence of positive 
peace as the ‘durable’ absence of violent conflict and (re)-displacement. Article 1C(4) of the 
1951 Convention stipulates that ‘refugee status ceases if refugees voluntarily re-establish 
themselves in the country of origin’ (EC/GC/02/5 2004:249). Knowing that significant Hutu 
refoulements occurred in 1996 from Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire (Pottier 1998), and 
knowing that survivors, perpetrators and other voluntary returns all came together in the years 
following the genocide, who ceases to be a ‘refugee’, and when? Even if ‘voluntary’ 
repatriation into this context occurs, is this a durable solution? The present thesis is a way to 
show how problematic the lack of agencies’ own answers to these questions can become.  
                                                 
10 ‘4Rs’ stand for repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction. In the ‘Framework for Durable 
Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern’, the High Commissioner proposes ‘4Rs’ as an ‘integrated 
approach to post-conflict situations’ (UNHCR 2004). 
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The notion of durability obscures what is in fact a more graduated and dynamic nature 
of ‘stability’ of return, defined as the likelihood of repeated displacement. The nexus allows 
reconceptualization of reconciliation (or the move towards it) along these lines, as the 
determinant of such ‘stability’, of what we might call a ‘non-necessity to flee’, signalling a 
reduced risk of future forced moves. The nexus is an attempt to surpass legalistic notions of 
‘refugeeness’, where refugees are ‘visible’ only when they cross the ‘definitional trip-wire’ 
that is the international border (Frelick, in Chimni 1993:444), materializing only as an 
anomaly on the landscape of sovereign power. It is an attempt to approach the under-
theorized political side of the phenomenon and the roots of forced displacement. The nexus is 
equally a way to decentre our study from ‘returnees’ to return as a space of relations between 
returnees and stayees, the latter of whom might be equally or more vulnerable.  
 
Nation-Building cum Reconciliation: Government’s Grapple with the Nexus 
If conflict lies at the core of the nexus, and if reconciliation lies at the core of stability 
of return, then identifying the ingredients for successful reconciliation is the central 
challenge. De-ethnicization is conceived by the Rwandan government as ‘reconciliation.’ 
While it is not the only reconciliatory strategy pursued, it does form a meta-initiative/meta-
narrative of co-existence.11 The strategy is lodged in the government’s own understanding of 
the conflict and its roots. Since politicized cleavages (notably, but not exclusively, ethnicity) 
were singled out as the core of the ‘Rwandan disease’ (Oomen 2004:16), the discursive 
complex of de-ethnicization is erected so as to call for their abolition, making them appear 
unnatural and redundant. They are to be replaced with an undifferentiating ‘Rwandanness’ 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006b), portrayed as ‘natural’ and desirable.  
 
De-ethnicization as Nation-Building: Elites, Power and the Use of Scripts 
Although researchers discard ‘laymen’s notions’ or what has been termed ‘folk 
sociology’ (Hirschfeld 1996, in Brubaker 2000:166), and take pride in being the analysts of 
‘naturalizers’ rather than ‘analytic naturalizers’, they cannot deny it is precisely these facile 
notions around which political entrepreneurs mobilize action and which at times, through a 
process of ‘reification’, can have a partly self-fulfilling effect (Brubaker 2002:166). As such, 
the task ahead is really two-fold: First, the potentially damaging dichotomy that underlies de-
ethnicization as an approach to reconciliation must be exposed. Second, and much more 
difficult, analysis must be made relevant. In other words, the need is to raise theory to a level 
where it can offer a practical, not merely conceptual, antidote to the simplistic fashioning and 
(possible) (ab)uses of identity by political actors. De-construction needs to be translated into 
a useful proscription for such political opposition.  
  
The present study builds on a ‘constructivist’ (ethnicity) or ‘modernist’ (nationalism) 
approach, and uses it to destabilize the partly primordial, generally simplistic and definitely 
self-serving approach of the Rwandan government. The study distinguishes between i) what 
nationalists speak of (the nation as ‘looming out of immemorial past’ and ‘gliding into a 
limitless future’, Anderson 1983:12); ii) nationalism being a recent historical phenomenon 
(Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Smith 1986); and, as some further argue iii) a presence 
                                                 
11 Transitional justice initiatives in Rwanda include retributive justice (e.g. ICTR in Arusha), restorative justice 
(e.g. gacaca courts), distributive justice (e.g. FARG funds) besides the overarching initiative to promote 
‘national unity’ (Oomen 2006).  
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continuously ‘under construction’ (‘imagined community’; ‘daily plebiscite’; ‘social work’). 
The constructivist/modernist debate does not ponder whether nation, ethnicity or other 
markers are false or true (Anderson 1983), but how, why, when, and to what extent they 
become salient, can be moulded, cast a certain way, ‘used’. Nations/ethnicities are not ‘things 
in the world’ but rather dynamic and evolving frames, ‘products of a historical process, which 
can only be studied in specific contexts’ (Berman 1998:311).  
 
In an essay entitled ‘Beyond Identity’, Brubaker (2000) warns that terms such as 
‘ethnicity’, ‘identity’ and ‘nationalism’ obscure more than they reveal. Instead of deploying 
analytical categories overloaded with meaning, he suggests disaggregating them along their 
different internal dynamics and functions. The terms should be approached in ‘relational, 
processual, eventful terms’, as ‘practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, 
discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, contingent events and political 
projects’ (ibid:167).  
 
The present study does not ponder ‘nationalism’,12 but rather the way an idea of a 
nation is brought into (forced into) being or, alternatively, re-invented. In the trilogy of 
nationalism as an ideology, nation as a collectivity, and nation-building as a process, it is the 
latter that forms the focus of the study. More specifically, it is the evocative word ‘building’ 
in ‘nation-building’ around which the present approach pivots: As a dynamic term, it 
surpasses the notion of a collective ‘imagining’ (Anderson 1983) by suggesting ‘enaction’. It 
thus embraces a more instrumental and performative concept of a ‘nation as a political 
project’. Nation-building thus understood implies an author and underscores the role of 
leadership (Doob 1964). It opens an analytical space for identification of agents of 
dissemination and relations of power. ‘Nationness’ can be understood as produced, 
‘broadcast’ and, through a complex process of adoption (or rejection), as propagated (or not). 
By adopting this frame, the study attempts to discern who in Rwanda re-invents a ‘nation’, 
how they do so, and what determines whether this project will be or should be accepted.  
 
The analysis that follows uses the notion of ‘scripts’, which can be defined as 
narrative sequences of considerable robustness in terms of repetition and overlap across 
persons/sources and time. These are ‘instrumental’ in the sense that they re-interpret history 
and society so as to allow a particular nationalist project to appear as logical and legitimate, 
and they are ‘instructive’, in the sense that they are taught, ‘policed’ and to be followed. The 
new nation-building project is studied mainly but not exclusively through these scripts (also 
laws, spaces of dissemination, etc.).  
 
Methodology: Treading Carefully Between Lines 
Language connects us with society through being the primary domain of ideology, 
and through being both the site of and stake in, struggles of power 
Norman Fairclough (1989:15) 
 
How do we study nationalist scripts? On one side lies ‘the said’ and ‘the written.’ On 
the other side lies an unvoiced functionality: the interpretations that ‘the said’ opens and 
forecloses, and the aims it thus makes intelligible. Bringing the politicality of a script into the 
                                                 
12 Nationalism can be understood as the principle which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent (Gellner 1983). 
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light requires a minute engagement with the text through the comparison of claims with 
historical record and with opinions and critiques that emerge from outside the discourse. By 
getting a sense of the repetitive ‘divergences’ in this way, one can develop a sense of the 
‘sub-text’, anything implied but not stated. By unravelling the nationalist script, the section 
on de-ethnicization develops our sense of sub-text. The section on ingando then includes a 
truncated de-ethnicization script (as taught in the camp) composed of both text and 
‘recalled’/verbalized sub-text. This method of reading is broadly grounded in theories of 
textual/discourse critique (Fairclough 1989, Derrida 1976). 
 
 
3. De-ethnicization: The Discursive Edifice and Its Fault-lines 
 
Many people who had the chance to visit Rwanda have been…intrigued by the fact 
that Rwandans are harmoniously living together only 10 years after the 
Genocide…Today, not only are Rwandans living together but they share the common 
aspirations as one people, as it used to be. 
‘All you need to know about Rwanda’, National University of Rwanda (2005)  
 
Is this really all we need to know, or should it rather be the point of departure in our 
‘project of knowing’: taking as curious not the proclaimed oneness but the aspiration to 
demonstrate it. In what follows, I aim to take apart de-ethnicization. I ask how does the 
project appear different from other African nation-building attempts? What are the script’s 
central precepts and how do they hold up to scrutiny? Is the ‘authorship’ of this project 
discernable? What are its functions? There is no study of Rwandan ‘de-ethnicization’ and the 
present study does not claim to offer a fulfilling account. Rather, it attempts to elucidate the 
binary opposition that underlies its structure and to destabilize it. The first two sections 
discern government’s positioning vis-à-vis the stylized quandary of nationalism, and the 
motives and uses of ‘appearance’ that underlie de-ethnicization discourse. The remainder of 
the chapter pays attention to the falsely opposed poles of ‘unity’ and ‘division’. 
 
Nationalisms in Africa: the Rwandan Government’s Answer to the ‘Central Paradox’ 
African nationalism is typically cast as a counter-reference to the 19th century 
ethnolinguistic movements in Europe: Instead of the ‘we’, it allegedly started with the ‘they’, 
the ‘illegitimate relevant other whose alien hegemony was rejected’ and moved to build the 
‘we’ on the basis of the territorial unit of colonial administration, ‘however lacking it might 
be in historical sanction’ (Young 1982:167). Such a theoretical approach, while sufficiently 
accurate in capturing the African ‘they’ versus ‘we’ departure, is nevertheless problematic 
inasmuch as it i) treats ‘Africa’ as an undifferentiated entity; ii) neglects those European 
nationalisms which were not nation-state (ethnolinguistic) but rather state-to-nation (e.g. 
Britain, France, Italy; Neuberger 1977:202); and iii) overlooks the fact that even in pre-
colonial times in Africa political and ‘ethnic’/‘linguistic’ boundaries rarely coincided (Colson 
1968:31). There is no ‘African’ nationalism, merely nationalisms in Africa.  
 
Nevertheless, the post-independence nation-building query (not unique to the region) 
indisputably revolved around how to achieve unity within the artificial post-colonial state 
often defined by a multiplicity of sub-state loyalties. This ‘central paradox’ was initially 
approached as ‘inspirational summons.’ In the modernist spirit of the times, post-
independence leaders believed that in order to progress, states had to resolve their ‘identity 
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crises’ (Young 1982:161-163). It was thought that ‘the finite energies of the state would be 
dissipated in fissiparous conflict unless the transcendent loyalties of the citizenry could be 
firmly tied to a national ideal’ (ibid.:163). National integration was seen as the development 
of an ‘integrating strand’ among networks of allegiances, requiring that ‘identification with 
the national community supersede…more limited ethnic loyalties’ (Smock and Bentsi-Enchill 
1976:5).  
 
The many crises of post-independence Africa undermined the initial nationalist 
optimism. Slowly, the ‘central paradox’ turned into ‘the problem of national integration in 
Africa’ (Alexander 1968, Smock and Bentsi-Enchill 1976). Consequently, many began to 
question whether the ‘viability of the state in all cases depends on investing this impersonal 
abstraction with the vibrant, nurturant, anthropomorphic properties of the nation’ (Young 
1982:165). Can and must the state be nationalized? The Rwandan government tailored an 
affirmative answer which remains very much lodged in modernist thinking: The government 
saw to it that if ‘nation’ couldn’t surpass other loyalties and become the primary allegiance in 
the state, and rather where politicized sub-state loyalties achieved the same to considerable 
detriment of the whole of society, then the need was to go further, and to act so as to dissolve 
the ‘central paradox’. The parallel with ‘high modernist’ (Scott 1998) self-confidence in the 
rational design of social order could not be more pronounced.  
 
From ‘Exclusionary’ to ‘Inclusionary’ National Narrative in Rwanda?: Politicizing the 
Entrepreneurship of Absence 
Nationalizing the state was presented by the power elite as a ‘solution’ in a post-
genocide society which at once opted for a political union, yet remained divided and perhaps 
unfamiliar to many returnees. Nationness was understood as a way to ‘re-root’ identity and 
anchor a sense of commonality, a way to achieve social cohesion post-conflict (Buckley-
Zistel 2006b:103). The essentially top-down project that ensued took the form of de-
ethnicization (ibid.). ‘Unity’, the notion of undifferentiating Rwandanness, was to replace the 
destructive sub-national loyalties, which were to be ‘discontinued’. The discourse of unity 
was thus from the start inseparable from that of destruction of ‘division.’ As such, the project 
separated itself from other nation-building attempts as it did not simply try to add an 
‘overlay’ over a multi-ethnic constituency through ‘national consciousness’ raising activities. 
The attempt was not to supersede, but to veto and replace. The preamble of the 2003 
Constitution clearly resolves to ‘eradicate ethnic, regional and any other form of divisions.’  
 
De-ethnicization is a dual discourse of ‘unity’ and ‘division’, where unity is salient 
but central only vis-à-vis its implication of making division appear redundant. ‘Division’, 
specifically ethnic division, is interpreted by the government both as what ailed the past and 
as what hinders a better future. It fits in line with the general ‘policy of breaking with the 
country’s troubled past’ (Afrol News, January 1 2002). Ethnic divisions run against the 
modernizing, forward-looking project of the political elite. According to Rusagara,13 ‘indeed, 
to emphasize Tutsi or Hutu is to cling to an outdated identity in the 21st Century Rwanda’. 
These are ‘absurd self-identifications’, if not ‘insults’ in today’s ‘Rwanda as a modern nation’ 
(Rusagara, 13 January 2006). Although destruction of ‘ethnicity’ (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) is 
central, the aim is to dispose of all ‘division’, which is however never fully defined.  
                                                 
13 General Frank Rusagara is a Ugandan returnee and former Deputy Minister of Defence, and high-profile 
instructor at ingando camps. Currently, he serves as the commandant of the Military Academy in Nyakinama. 
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De-ethnicization has to be framed vis-à-vis the counter-posed and zero-sum 
constellation of Tutsi and Hutu nationalisms that preceded it. It is from such counter-
reference that de-ethnicization attempts to draw strength. As Baines (2003:483) highlights 
‘the construction of the post-colonial Hutu nation dialogically competed with that of the 
imagined Tutsi nation.’ For either radical Hutu or Tutsi ‘no other political reality was more 
definitive than that of the other’ (Mamdani 2001:76). The centre of the opposition were 
discrepant ‘origin myths’, which led to ‘divergent interpretations of who has access to 
resources and claims to citizenship within the nation’ (Baines 2003:483). It is in this field of 
vision that unity appears as ‘beneficial’ and ‘necessary’, and all ‘difference’ as ‘destructive.’ 
Unity is after all ‘inclusionary’ and difference ‘excludes.’ Naturally, this ‘play of 
appearances’ will be challenged, and it will be shown that ‘unity’ as cast through de-
ethnicization can also powerfully ‘exclude’. 
 
No theory of de-ethnicization exists in the sense used here, as a crusade to destroy 
both ethnicity-based discourse and the use of ethnicity as an ordering principle of association, 
whether cultural or political. But theories of the process of ethnicization can help us 
understand what de-ethnicization involves. At the most basic level, it attempts the undoing of 
social boundaries. Constructions of identity as political projects tend to ‘essentialize’ 
identities (Fearon and Laitin 2000). In a curious twist, the Rwandan government not only 
‘essentializes’ (‘unity’/‘Rwandanness’) but also ‘constructivizes’ identities in order to be able 
to dissolve them. The government insists that ‘if ethnic differences can be learned, so can the 
idea that ethnicity does not exist’ (Lacey 2004). Ethnic identity is actively created as 
fabricated and fixed, and the fabrication as imposed by the colonizer. The unity that replaces 
divisions thus attempts to solidify itself against this ‘other’ of the past and in a sense presents 
itself as the ‘second independence’ from colonial rule.  
 
In Rwanda, possible motives and effects of the ‘entrepreneurship of absence’ need to 
be carefully assessed. Absence of ethnicity, just as its presence, has to be politicized. As Uvin 
(1999:267) suggests, ‘absence of ethnicity is as important a political marker as its presence’. 
While the political functions of ethnicity are well-recognized, its rejection is less theorized as 
a political tool. Yet we know that in Burundi for instance ‘explicit denial of ethnicity fulfilled 
an important legitimizing function for the power elite for three decades’ (Uvin 1999:267). 
Under the second republic of Jean Baptiste Bagaza, all references to ethnicity were outlawed 
but the language of national unity was used to ‘integrate, to solidify and rationalize Tutsi 
hegemony’ (Lemarchand 1996:107). As the last section shows, while it is not evident that 
purposeful/coordinated self-legitimization lies at the core of Rwandan de-ethnicization, the 
perception certainly exists that the project legitimizes a minority rule in the sense that it 
enables it and perpetuates it.  
 
The Binary Unravelling, Part 1: ‘Unity’ 
i. Construction: Re-readings of History 
Societies seeking to move forward from [genocide] must have the courage to go back 
thousands of years into their past to rediscover their inherent potential, and armed 
with that, to move forward again, with the force of thousand of years in order to 
smash their way into the future.  
     Paul Nantulya (NTK November 14 2005) 
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The notion of ‘unity’ (ubumwe) is central to the de-ethnicization discourse and a 
particular re-reading of history is used to buttress its validity. The attempt is to reconnect with 
the pre-colonial past of Rwanda in which ‘unity and harmony’ prevailed but which was 
‘arrested’ by the colonialists (Buckley-Zistel 2006b). In this rendering, the colonialists 
created the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi, which previously were no more than loose 
categories of social status with the possibility of mobility between them. Ethnicity was 
invented, and thereafter politicized (Buckley-Zistel 2006a). The argument boils down to how 
‘the type of clientship, the ubuhake cattle contract [with mostly Tutsi as overlords] has 
shaped ethnic relations over time [but] done so with harmony [emphasis added]’ (Pottier 
2002:65).  
 
The idealized and wholly uncritical rendering of pre-colonial times permeates 
government documents, speeches and history instruction at ingando camps. A few examples 
should suffice. President Paul Kagame expounds: ‘We...share one country, we share one 
language, we share everything…Why don’t we look at ourselves as Rwandans?’14 ‘The 
Rwandan nation, known in the region since the 11th century, is founded on the common 
history of its citizens, on the shared common values, on unity of language and culture.’15 
Rwanda as a nation ‘is not merely a geographical space, but an enduring idea that is self-
generating … indestructible, and invincible. … Historical negation and self-denial of the 
Rwandan nation [was] propagated by colonialists and the Roman Catholic Church’ (Rusagara 
13 January 2006). Ex-President Pasteur Bizimungu explains that ‘divisions were mostly 
brought about by the colonialists who had their own hidden agenda, and this brought about 
different situations and periods which Rwandans have undergone including genocide and the 
refugee life’ (Radio Rwanda 1997a). 
 
ii. Un-Construction: Where the Myth Falters  
The idyllic ‘unity’ can be problematized on three interconnected counts: First, no 
sense of ‘rwandanness’ as self-conscious belonging existed in pre-colonial times. Second, 
geographical unity falters when the diachronic dissect (‘historicizing of territoriality’) shows 
past territoriality not to be ‘bounded’ in the present sense, and the present borders to be 
arbitrary in what they encompass. Third, no unity as ‘harmonious coexistence’ can be easily 
substantiated. Un-constructing unity is not an attempt to embrace the other binary pole or to 
undermine faith in prospects of coexistence. Rather, it aims to destabilize the nationalist 
construct by pointing to the complexity of the past which in no easy way supports or rejects 
‘unity’ or ‘division’.  
 
According to Vansina (2001:2), in the pre-colonial era, self-awareness of belonging 
was primarily connected with ‘various kingdoms, and in some cases, family communities’. 
Regional and sub-regional cultures also defined one’s loyalty, in addition to clan, class and 
client networks (Newbury 2001). In fact, until some time after 1900, ‘there was no general 
concept of “Rwanda”’ (Vansina 2001:2). The word used to refer to a ‘central plateau with a 
surrounding area.’ Accordingly, one might have referred to the rwanda of Nyiginya as much 
as to the rwanda of Burundi or other places (ibid.). ‘The self-awareness of all the inhabitants 
                                                 
14 Speech given at Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars in 2004. 
15 The quote comes from ‘The Vision 2020’, one of the ‘two key government documents’, adopted by 
government in 2000 and ‘encapsulating the essence of [its] development philosophy’ (UNDP 2004b). 
 - 14 -
that they were ‘Rwandan’ came only with the colonial period and was related to their shared 
experiences during that time’ (ibid.).  
 
The expression ‘shared experiences’ refers the added reality of territorially-
demarcated and centralized rule, but obfuscates both the previously shifting and fluid 
boundaries (Vansina 2004) and the arbitrariness of the original colonial demarcation. Political 
centralization under the Nyiginya kingdom was not founded on ‘uniform territorial 
administration consistent throughout the country and especially throughout the area known 
presently as Rwanda’ (Newbury 2002:143). The kingdom was never a space of delineated 
borders, but rather conceived of its ambulatory capital with ‘outlying regions’ (Vansina 
2004:62). Further, full centralization only happened in the 1920s when the central court 
annexed what is today North-West Rwanda and other peripheral regions.  
 
At the time of partition, colonials not only ‘fixed’ borders, but they added some 
regions and left out others. Today’s county of Bufumbira in Uganda had in fact been part of 
the Nyiginya kingdom (Van Der Meeren 1996:261). Similarly, the dynastic sphere of 
influence stretched into parts of Eastern Zaire (North Kivu and Idjwi Island) but the link was 
severed by the 1885 Berlin Conference whereby ‘the Kinyarwanda-speaking population 
stopped paying tribute to the Nyiginya king’ (Pottier 1998:153). Even after partition, the 
colonials at different points considered dividing the state into two, based on a broadly 
conceived division between east and west of the country (Newbury 2001:293), and 
consolidating Burundi and Rwanda in one administrative unit under a single vice governor 
(ibid:289).  
 
While neither divisions nor unity completely explain the history, to proclaim that pre-
colonial ‘Rwanda’ was a peaceful/non-conflictual society with flexible inter-class mobility is 
to severely simplify historical dynamics. Violent conflicts occurred between kingdoms and 
within the kingdom (Newbury 2001:293), between clans, and between the Tutsi and Hutu 
themselves (Nsanze 2002:150). It is true that in pre-colonial times we can i) better 
conceptualize Hutu and Tutsi as class rather than as ethnicity (even that only after 1800; 
Vansina 2001:2); and that ii) colonizers fixed the boundaries of these classes and heightened 
horizontal inequality by systematically and structurally entrenching the privilege and power 
of one class over the other. That said, mobility between classes was always minimal (Pottier 
2002). It was further severely occluded with the introduction of uburetwa or corveé labour 
under the rule of Rwabugiri (?-1895). Most importantly, the combination of increasing 
exploitation and humiliation provoked ‘a rift that tore the whole society of two million apart’ 
so that in 1890, ‘it teetered on the brink of total anomy’ (Vansina 2004:197). As much 
damage as the colonials indisputably and irrevocably wreaked, the apotheosis of a ‘unified’ 
and ‘peaceful’ nation simply does not do justice to the complex past.  
  
iii. Myths and Power: Can the Long-Standing Relationship be Undone? 
Myth-making, meaning selective and distorting historical reading, and ‘top-down 
history telling’ is neither a novelty in nation-building (Snyder and Ballentine 1996, Smith 
1986), nor in the historiography of Rwanda. Political institutions generally ‘justify and 
legitimate themselves through discourses on the past’ (Jewsiewicki 1986:12) and ‘new social 
situations generate both new political movements and new historical myths’ (Vansina 
1998:38). Myths adapt to the ‘necessities of the present’, history becomes re-interpreted in 
what seems to be a ‘universal quest for a useful precedent’ (Lonsdale 1989:128). 
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In Rwanda, myth-making in the service of political legitimization has, however, 
proven especially harmful. Even in pre-colonial times, history told a certain way was 
important (Vansina 2000:378). While oral history allowed for the proliferation of different 
versions,16 only the dominant one was preserved through the dynasty’s courts (ibid.). The 
court historian’s task was to ‘hand down to posterity the glorious traditions of the realm – not 
as history might have it but, rather, as royal ordinance prescribed’ (Lemarchand 1970:32). In 
this era, the Tutsi dynastic myth based on a poem ‘The Story of the Origins’ was used to 
legitimize the Nyiginya rule (Lemarchand 1970:33). ‘Tutsi’ elitism was later strengthened 
with the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ (with Europeans as ‘myth-makers’), avowing racial supremacy. 
During the first and second republics, the Hamitic hypothesis was turned against itself, and 
favoured Hutu legitimization of majority rule and the exclusion of the minority Tutsi, who, 
according to the myth, had migrated into Rwanda from Ethiopia. The ‘superiors’ and ‘rulers’ 
swiftly turned into ‘foreigners’ and ‘invaders’ (Lemarchand 1999:6).  
 
Today, few dispute that Rwandan history dotted by a sequence of myths needs to be 
rewritten (Newbury 2002:140). Rewriting, however, should signify a turn to complexity, 
rather than the creation of another self- (those in power-) serving caricature. The past should 
not be ‘used’; its lessons are elusive after all: Depending on when we anchor our 
retrospective, we learn different lessons. Across time, the borders of the Nyiginya kingdom 
were fluctuating and differently conceptualized, loyalties shifted, new loyalties developed, 
and continue to do so today. Importantly, the fact that idealistically conceived ‘unity’ does 
not hold up to scrutiny does not mean that Rwandans cannot conceive of a ‘commonality’ 
useful for future co-existence, and this idea is explored in more depth in the last section.  
 
iv. Script Reproduction and Authorship 
What is perhaps even more remarkable than the skewed reading servicing de-
ethnicization, is the lack of critique of this discourse, and its reproduction. No single 
Rwandese intellectual could be found to take a public position on Jan Vansina’s Le Rwanda 
Ancien, the most essential recent work of Rwandan history which attacks all the tenets of the 
official story today (DeLame 2004:10). Government maintains a ‘monopoly over knowledge 
production’ (Pottier 2002:109) and polices its reproduction. The official historical narrative is 
open to replication but closed to debate. Although the government has banned teaching of 
history in schools after the genocide (Hodgkin 2006:203), the absence of curriculum does not 
leave a vacuum: The ‘official’, ‘politically correct’ history gets reinforced through trials, 
gacaca, ingando, public addresses, documents and commemorations (ibid.:203).  
 
Often in reporting and speeches, it is the impersonal ‘Rwanda’ that ‘does’, ‘aims’ and 
‘achieves.’ But since I conceptualized de-ethnicization as a ‘project’, I aimed to explore the 
agents of its dissemination. Today, the key institution for the (re)production of scripts 
underlying de-ethnicization is the 1999-instituted and partly donor-financed National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). Although NURC is ‘officially’ vested with 
overseeing the production of ‘unity and reconciliation’ (NURC 2005; NURC Official 
Website www.nurc.gov.rw/; Kaiza 2003), dissemination ‘happens’ in a more deregulated way 
through reproduction of scripts in official speeches, media, and in general in any type of 
publicly uttered ‘text.’ Authorship in this sense is dispersed and unfinished. 
                                                 
16 Oral societies do allow for a more bottom-up understanding of history, as the work of Vansina and Newbury 
shows. Such, currently marginal, approaches can be harnessed to destabilize official stories.  
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The Binary Unravelling, Part 2: ‘Division’ 
‘Division’ is the silent counter-reference to the salient ‘unity.’ References to unity are 
present in the text and reproduced, division is absent with the exception of when it needs to 
be ‘explained away.’ The structure of this section should visually suggest the iceberg nature 
of ‘division’ – it is suppressed. We know its importance only through the punishment of its 
emergence. In the simplistic binary opposition, that which falls short of unity is to be outcast. 
Yet not all that falls short of unity is division. The logic threatens to subsume under ‘division’ 
all ‘difference.’ Division has in reality over-spilling boundaries and this is reflected in the 
sphere of ‘prohibition’ and in the punitive practice.  
 
The government’s aim is to create a population that ‘identifies itself by nationality 
and not by ethnicity’ (Hodgkin and Montefiore 2005:6). All references to ethnicity (ethnic 
labelling) are banned from public discourse. Citizens are no longer required to carry identity 
cards (indangamutu or carte d’identité), which were originally instated by the Belgians in 
1933 and discontinued in 1996. Newspapers as well as radio stay clear of ethnic labels and so 
do schools (Hodgkin 2006). But besides ethnicity, other ‘divisive categories’ (such as les 
rwandais de l’exterieur or les Ougandais) are replaced with the broad category Banyarwanda 
(the people of Rwanda) (Zorbas 2004:43). References to identities which are not officially 
sanctioned are met with public shaming campaigns, labelling the individuals as génocidaires 
or negationists, and can even result in formal charges (Zorbas 2004:43). Political 
organizations are prohibited from basing themselves ‘on race, ethnic group, tribe, clan, 
region, sex, religion or any other division [emphasis added]’ (GLCSS 2006). 
 
Punishment of ‘divisionism’ went into effect on 18 December 2001 when the ‘Law 
Instituting Punishment for Offences of Discrimination and Sectarianism’ was passed (Law N 
47/2001). Sectarianism is defined in Article 1(2) as ‘use of any speech, written statement or 
action that divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an 
uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination as defined 
in 1(1).’ Besides the penalties of imprisonment and fines, Article 6 provides for, ‘depending 
on the seriousness of the consequences’, dissolution of the association, political party or non-
profit organization that is found guilty. 
 
Many observers note that the law is vague, leaving doors open for ‘selective and 
politically motivated’ interpretations and enforcement (Zorbas 2004:44; Mgbako and 
Stubbins 2004:6) and has been used to weaken and destroy opposition (Mgbako 2005:6). 
During the 2003 presidential elections, the only likely rival to the RPF, the Democratic 
Republican Movement (MDR), was dissolved on charges of being ‘harbingers of genocidal 
ideology’ (Mgbako 2005:6). In 2004, the parliament requested the dissolution of a number of 
religious associations and a forum of farmers’ organizations, and has reprimanded secondary 
schools and the national university for retaining divisionists. Other national and international 
organizations including human rights and civil rights groups were similarly accused (HRW 
2004; Mgbako 2005).  
  
Conclusion 
To grasp a discourse in the totality of its iteration is impossible. But a partial view 
does allow assessment of the basic tenets and the fault lines of this ‘imported’ and 
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instrumental, deregulated but controlling discourse. Today, the government continues to wish 
its past-abandoning and future-embracing vision into existence by incessantly invoking 
‘unity’ through textual presence and hushing the complex tensions that mark the social 
landscape. While punitive apparatus and practice speak of some real threat to be 
‘neutralized’, the discourse of unity self-legitimizes by making ‘division’ seem a ‘false 
consciousness’ imposed over what was always and ‘essentially’ a ‘unified society.’ The false 
binary at the root of de-ethnicization pits an idealized yet never-existing harmonious unity 
against anything that falls short. Beyond genocidal ‘divisionism’ conceived of in ethnic terms 
(i.e. Hutu versus Tutsi), it attacks other potential ‘divisions’ (e.g. regional), often merely 
‘difference’ and as such ‘divergence’ of opinion and diversity.  
 
 
4. Ingando: ‘Transition Camps’ as Spaces of Discourse Dissemination 
   
Ingando camps are a microcosm of the attempted linkage between repatriation and 
reconciliation through de-ethnicization. Ingando is not a ‘high profile’ activity like gacaca 
and has been little studied. It is selective in its targeting and as such has drawn relatively 
small numbers overall. Over the past years its appeal has nonetheless increased rapidly. 
Importantly, by targeting populations that the government believes are most in need of ‘re-
education’, it reveals both the way in which dissemination of de-ethnicization scripts 
happens, and the scripts’ functionality.  
 
Ingandos are non-voluntary17 retreats of several hundred people at a time, combining 
cultural activities, instruction and community work. They are presented as reintegratory and 
reconciliatory practices where people come together to learn and ‘discuss’ problems of 
national concern such as causes of conflict. Ingandos were conceived as ‘calculated efforts on 
the part of the government...aimed at achieving lasting harmony among the Rwandese 
people’ (Radio Rwanda December 9 1997). Closer scrutiny, however, reveals them to be a 
space of tightly upheld military-like discipline18 and instruction rather than debate.  
 
Since their inception soon after the genocide, the three to eight week long camps have 
been known variously as ‘solidarity camps’, ‘re-education’ camps, ‘civic education’ camps, 
‘political awareness’ camps, ‘reorientation’ camps, and ‘reintegration’ courses, and have 
targeted different segments of the population. Those who have been ‘re-educated’ include 
‘old caseload’ and ‘new caseload’ returnees, ex-FAR soldiers and demobilized rebels, 
provisionally released prisoners, sex workers and, most recently, pre-university students on 
government scholarships, teachers, youth groups, an d civil servants. The tendency has been 
to expand the target constituency. Total numbers for attendance have never been published, 
and only very partial counts can be gleaned from the press or deduced (e.g. prison releases). 
 
The following analysis focuses on two groups – returnees and provisionally released 
prisoners – for whom ingando is both a physical transitory space (from outside inside their 
communities) and a figurative one as well (from outside inside the new ideology). The 
transmission of scripts might be especially clear among ingandos organized for these 
populations because they are either i) most at disconnect with the discourse (returnees who 
                                                 
17 While there is no law requiring attendance, it is far from voluntary. According to HRW (2000), participants 
attend because they feel obliged or have been told by the authorities that they must.  
18 For example: ‘Before the start of each lesson, an instructor asks the ex-prisoners to sit and stand and repeats 
the command until they respond in perfect unison’ (AFP August 12 2005). 
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have lived abroad for an extended time); and/or ii) most in opposition to them (released 
prisoners still potentially harbouring ‘divisionism’). Ingando for these populations is really an 
integration exercise outfitted not only with ‘political’ and ‘history’ education but also 
practical lessons concerning health, and policies and programmes of the government (e.g. 
regarding poverty alleviation). The camps have the potential to enhance our understanding of 
both the dissemination of nationalist scripts and the use of ‘tradition’ and ‘folklore’ as a 
technology of discursive reproduction. The latter, being a particularly interesting take on 
‘performativeness’ of nation-building, would require extensive fieldwork.  
 
Since academic sources are minimal, this section draws primarily but not exclusively 
on 108 news articles spanning 14 years (June 1994 to May 2007). Notes produced by camp 
participants and gathered together in a document prepared by Penal Reform International 
(PRI) have also been crucial, specifically in the study of scripts. As regards print articles, 
while some centred around the camp issue, others merely touched upon it. Many have been 
written by Rwandan journalists for The New Times (Kigali), a government-leaning 
newspaper, but also for the Kenyan Standard and other major news agencies (BBC, AFP, 
Xinhua). Although the articles cannot be described as a ‘mouthpiece’ of the prevalent official 
attitudes, very few are in fact critical. Dissent and questioning of the official scripts in camps 
is occasionally highlighted only to be in turn refuted. Repetitiveness and thematic unity as 
regards description as well as value judgments are strikingly robust across years and different 
writers. Most worryingly, NGOs and development agencies, some of which sponsor the 
camps, often unwittingly reproduce the sound-bites of the official discourse in the same 
manner the discourse reproduces itself, compactly and unquestioningly19 (see e.g. DFID 
2007; World Bank 2007; UNDP 2004a; UNDP 2004b; UNRCS 2001).  
 
Unwrapping the Packaging: Production of ‘Traditionality’ 
i. Revival of the Customary, Return to ‘Authenticity’? 
Ingando is often highlighted as a Rwandan ‘tradition’, one among many restored to 
their glory in the recent wave of ‘traditionalization’ of transitional justice. On the tenth 
anniversary of the genocide, the Kenyan daily The East African Standard (April 7 2004) 
reports that ‘from the traditional gacaca courts to the Solidarity camps (Ingando)… 
[Rwanda] is slowly fermenting a culture of peace in its own traditional style.’ Rwanda is said 
to take part in the ‘African Renaissance’ (Nantulya 2005) reflected in the ‘continent revival 
of the customary’ (Oomen 2006:8). ‘Productions’ of traditionality, however, should not 
escape wary scrutiny. As Lonsdale (1989:132) has noted, ‘the idea of African custom and 
tradition arose mainly as a means to hallow official histories or, better, deify officials’ 
history’.  
 
Reconciliatory activities claiming to be based in tradition abound. They spring up 
primarily from the ‘factory’ of NURC and are partly financed by international donors. 
Gacaca is a well-studied example, described as ‘traditional’, ‘grassroots’ courts, which partly 
sprang from a hostile reaction towards ‘western’ justice (Zorbas 2004:36), and whose 
rationale is being ‘vested in their authenticity’ (Oomen 2006:8). Among other, less known 
activities are the Abakangurambaga or peace volunteers, the Abunzi or mediation committee 
members, the Inyangamugayo or ‘persons of integrity’ presiding over the gacaca trials, the 
                                                 
19 If and when ingando is explained in programme documents/reports/annual assessments, it is in a couple of 
lines, whose content/phrasing is highly similar to ‘official’ (NURC) description, and is wholly uncritical. 
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NURC clubs in schools ‘continuing the work of ingando’ (NURC Official Website 
www.nurc.gov.rw/). Further, umuganda or community service has been revived ‘in the 
interests of national reconstruction’ (ibid.). Ubusabane, regionally- or cell-organized ‘get-
together festivals’, are also organized with the aim to ‘enhance unity and reconciliation and to 
promote partnership among communities’ (NURC 2007:3).  
 
ii. Archaeology of a Tradition  
If ingando is an ‘ancient institution’ (Nantulya 2006:48) as claimed, how are its roots 
explained? Investigation produces a number of divergent explanations by Rwandans 
themselves. Most often, ingando is alleged to derive from the Kinyarwanda verb kuganika, 
which refers to a custom where the elders of a community would ‘leave the distractions of 
their daily lives and retreat to places of isolation to solve problems of national concern such 
as war, famine or drought’ (NURC Official Website). Others tie it to a related word kuganda 
or kugandika purportedly referring to the ‘halting of normal activities to find solutions to 
national challenges’ (Nantulya 2006:47; NURC 2007). While such custom continues to this 
day, there is no evidence that it would ever be called ingando (Mgbako 2005:7).  
 
The word might be more closely related to the word ingabo or army. According to 
Rusagara, ingando refers to a pre-colonial military encampment or assembly area 
(rendezvous) where troops used to receive their final briefing while readying for a military 
expedition (Rusagara 2006a). Rusagara adds quite expeditiously that in such gatherings 
‘individuals are reminded to subject their interests to the national ideal and give Rwanda their 
all.’ This means that ‘whatever differences one might have, the national interests always 
prevail since the nation of Rwanda is bigger than any one individual’ (ibid.). In another 
address, Rusagara (PRI 2004:111) relates ingando to broader practices of Amotorero 
(military regiments) of the pre-colonial period where ‘both young men and women would be 
given lessons in history and culture, trying to instil a common identity.’  
 
More sceptical observers suggest that ingando has roots in the more recent past. 
According to Mgbako, ingando is likely a pre-war, exile creation aimed at mobilization of 
RPF supporters in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda itself, possibly modelled on solidarity 
camps in Uganda (Mgbako 2005; Reed 1995). At these schools, ‘cadres learned about the 
goals of the RPF and received military training’ (Reed 1995:51). Further, connection could 
also be established with so called ‘political schools’, originally established by the RPF with 
the help of its cells within Rwanda as an alternative strategy to increase its support base 
during the 1990-1994 civil war. Interestingly, some have speculated that it was precisely 
these schools that caused suspicion and made internal opposition to the Habyarimana regime 
‘reluctant to send their young leaders to the RPF zones’ (Reed 1996:469).  
 
iii. Invention, Reinvention, Iteration?  
With regard to the divergencies in explanation, is ingando an invention, a re-invention 
or merely a show of the iterative nature of ever-evolving/never-static cultural practices? As 
already mentioned, re-appropriations of the past are not uncommon, and different 
retrospectives might have inspired ingando before and after it was created. But were these re-
appropriations guided by the degree to which they legitimized de-ethnicization? And were the 
past practices themselves reinterpreted to better fit once borrowed? The divergence, along 
with the discrepancy (ingando and kuganika), and the use of tropes such as ‘common 
identity’ and ‘give Rwanda their all’, suggest that indeed reinterpretations are made to fit 
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present objectives. Ingando is not a simple iteration of a clearly identifiable cultural practice. 
But similarly, it is not a simple ‘cultural invention’, which might connote ahistoricity. In a 
more balanced rendition, ingando can be viewed as a useful re-invention.  
 
As novel re-appropriations of the past in the service of a present goal, ingandos may 
be likened to Hobsbawm and Ranger’s (1983:1) ‘invented’ traditions (although the term ‘re-
invented’ is more appropriate) defined as ‘set of practices...of a ritual or symbolic nature’, 
seeking to ‘inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which 
automatically implies continuity with the past…preferably a suitable historical past’. 
Invented traditions are divided among: i) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion 
and collective identities; ii) those establishing or legitimizing institutions and social 
hierarchies; and iii) those socializing people into particular social contexts (ibid.:9). Ingando 
in fact subsumes all three functions, seeking to achieve cohesion by ingraining a new 
collective identity, using in the process history as a ‘legitimator of action’ (ibid.:12), and 
attempting to socialize or ‘reintegrate’ various population segments to the ‘new Rwanda.’ As 
a single act, however, ingando differs from traditions meant to inculcate values by repetition. 
 
Although creation of these ‘ritual and symbolic complexes’ has not been adequately 
studied, we know that inventions occur more frequently when ‘a rapid transformation of 
society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which “old” traditions had been designed’ 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983:4). Rwanda’s ‘production of traditionality’ might be a 
reflection of the attempted departure from the immediate past, yet simultaneous anchoring of 
the present in the pre-colonial era, which might offer a sense of connection and thus a source 
of legitimacy. 
 
From Outside Inside, Part 1: Returnees 
The original idea of using ingando as a reconciliatory practice allegedly arose out of 
meetings at the Urugwiro State House in the years following the genocide (Mgbako 2005:7) 
and was targeted at the integration of the Tutsi returnees, some of whom had spent decades in 
exile. The idea was to ‘foster a sense of nationalism among the returnee populations from 
Congo, Burundi, Uganda and Europe, and elsewhere’ (ibid.:8). As Colonel Rusagara notes,  
We thought that if we could remove these people from their daily lives and bring them 
together to share from a common dish—to eat and sleep together—this would build 
confidence in the diverse populations of repatriated Rwandans, confidence that we could in 
fact live together. (Rusagara, in Mgbako 2005:8) 
 
While for the ‘old caseload’ returnees the primary attempt was to foster a sense of 
unity, for the ‘new caseload’ Hutu ingando was equally an attempt to override ‘divisionism.’ 
Human Rights Watch (1998:3) reports that these latter camps were meant to ‘promote ideas 
of nationalism, erase ethnically-charged lessons of the previous government and spur loyalty 
to the RPF.’ It was on 24 May 1997 that President Pasteur Bizimungu officially launched a 
programme for ‘national political awareness’ for the returning Hutu. In his address, he talked 
about a recently-instituted youth camp: ‘This camp, like many others which will take place 
countrywide are aimed at integrating the youth that have just returned from exile in the 
current social and political life’ (Radio Rwanda May 24 1997). The camps were instituted 
because the government felt such repatriated people needed ‘disintoxication’ (AFP November 
19 1997), ‘clearing of minds’ (Xinhua February 18 1998) after exposure to Hutu extremist 
brainwashing in the refugee camps.  
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The total number of participants, either ‘old caseload’ or ‘new caseload’ returnees, is 
not known. AFP reported that the last of the solidarity camps for the ‘new caseload’ refugees 
who came home in 1996 were closed in mid-November 1997 having ‘re-educated’ 44,000 
people (November 19 1997). There is evidence suggesting, however, that camps continued to 
be organized for returnees after 1997.20 There is no evidence to suggest that all returnees 
would go through ingando. In fact, the little evidence there is regarding ‘new caseload’ Hutu 
(both the AFP figure and report) indicates the camps in fact housed only ‘elite’ of sorts: 
students, church members, and civil servants ‘who wanted to return to their jobs.’ 
 
From Outside Inside, Part 2: Provisionally Released Prisoners 
Often in prison since the end of the genocide, the ‘provisionally released prisoners’21 
were in a sense themselves ‘newcomers’ to Rwanda. Their ‘re-education’ was thus as 
important as for the returnees and perhaps more so as they were seen to be the prime 
harbingers of ‘divisionism.’ A prisoner at Nsinda confessed that ‘I never though I would see 
this country again, I have been living in this country without seeing it. I am sure many things 
have changed’ (Internews January 31 2003). Jomba Gakumba instructs the ingando 
participants: ‘You have been in prison for long and I want to tell you that Rwanda is no 
longer the same’ (NTK February 18 2007). From 2003 when the releases commenced until 
2007, approximately 56,000 released prisoners participated in ingando.  
  
‘Erasing of old beliefs’, ‘erasing of political ideologies of the previous regime’, 
‘reorientation’, ‘reorienting of minds’ and ‘sensitization’ were frequently deployed 
descriptions by a variety of reporters. Ingando was further described as teaching the 
participants how to be ‘good citizens’ (Hirondelle May 6 2003), aiding their ‘harmonious 
integration into society’ (AFP January 27 2003) or ‘rehabilitation into society’ (Internews 
February 26 2003), helping them ‘learn how to lead a normal life again’ (Xinhua April 23 
2004), ‘how to better associate with members of their own communities’ (NTK February 28 
2007). The participants are taught the history of Rwanda among other things (Standard April 
6 2003). ‘After being out of touch with the ordinary people, there is a need for them to be 
taught about what the new Rwanda needs. It is not division but unity’ (ibid.). Jean Pierre, a 
participant at Kucikiro camp, says ‘we learn that there are no Hutus, Tutsis or Twas, we are 
all and only Rwandans’ (AFP August 12 2005). 
 
Lessons in History: ‘Unity’  
The most direct insight into the content and manner of instruction at ingando comes 
from notes of participants at the Gishamvu camp for provisionally released prisoners. The 
notes were collected in the period February-April 2003 by Penal Reform International (PRI) 
and their translated version can be found in an annex to one of PRI’s reports on gacaca. 
Although the notes are limited to a specific type of ingando, the script that emerges bears 
striking similarities to the government script discussed above. Ingando history classes seem 
to replicate basic tenets of de-ethnicization. Excerpts from the history notes (PRI 2004: 91-
                                                 
20 Interview with Thobias Bergman, April 24 2007 (London). Bergman did research with NURC in 2004, and 
visited a camp for 300-400 returnees.  
21 To ease prison overcrowding, Kagame issued a decree in 2003 to start a phased provisional release of 
genocide suspects who confessed and who were either elderly or terminally ill or ran the risk of being in prison 
longer than the sentences they were expected to incur.  
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104) are organized so as to provide a distilled version of the de-ethnicization script. They are 
presented as what Malkki (1995:56) calls a ‘panel’, an ‘extended narrative passage …giving 
[key] fragments of the standardized historical narrative.’ The sub-text or the ‘silenced’ yet 
‘instrumental’ implication of each key fragment is included in square brackets:  
 
Panel 1. Unity 
What today is an ethnic group was previously nothing more than a degree of wealth [ethnicity 
is not entrenched]. …A basic analysis of Rwanda’s history shows that the colonial power was 
at the root of the ethnic strife that Rwanda is going through… The colonial power established 
the ethnic groups and categorized Rwandans according to them, even having this 
categorization noted in the identity papers [violence based in ethnic groupness has been 
forced upon us]…Today, the Government of National Unity has removed this indication from 
the identity cards and call on all Rwandans to consider themselves as members of the same 
family without any distinction whatsoever…We are all Rwandans! [we can now become one 
and undifferentiable because sufficient steps have been taken to allow this]…We believe that 
reconciliation is possible, since Hutu and Tutsi Rwandans have always lived together in 
peace. They shared everything, intermarried, exchanged cows, made blood pacts and 
practised the cult of ancestors together without discrimination [many commonalities used to 
bind us together in the ancient times of harmony]…Rwanda is and will be what we want it to 
be [we are not prisoners of any label (although we might be prisoners if we resort to them)].  
 
Rite of Passage: Liminality and the Reproduction of Power 
Ingando is not only a re-invention, drawing authority from its ‘authenticity’, but it is 
also a rite of passage, an experience signifying social and at times even physical transition 
from the outside inside the ‘New Rwanda Order’ (Mbabazi 2005). According to Hobsbawm 
and Ranger (1983:10), new political regimes ‘might seek to find their own equivalents for the 
traditional rites of passage’, some form of a stylized acknowledgement of or an impetus for 
the desired transformation of their subjects. As conceptualized for the first time by Gennep 
(1909), a rite of passage has three phases: separation, liminality and incorporation. The first 
phase refers to withdrawal from society. The second is a phase between states, and hence a 
space of limbo. In the last phase, having completed the rite, an individual re-enters the 
society.  
 
As a re-invented ‘traditionality’ and thus ‘authenticized’ liminality, ingando harnesses 
script reproduction. Released prisoners see it as ‘quasi mystic’, experiencing it as a 
‘purgatory through which everyone must pass’ (PRI 2004:19). But it is the ingando for 
returnees that perhaps most powerfully invokes the spatial metaphors that Gennep used to 
explain rites of passage (rite is like a domestic threshold or a frontier between places, both 
neither here nor there, but rather ‘betwixt and between’). While passing through a ‘reception 
centre’ might be no more than a surveillance act, passing ingando is where ‘repatriation’ 
happens. As Annette Birungi writes ‘there is no “going back” because the identity of 
returnees and community…have been changed. It is in this changed and changing landscape 
that reintegration happens’ (Birungi 2005). It is also in this landscape that ingando is 
indispensable, to teach people what is expected of them in the ‘new Rwanda.’ The return is to 
a patria as ‘imagined’ through de-ethnicization, a selectively read nation of ‘commonality 
without division.’ Although ingando poses as a reconciliatory measure based on discussion 
and problem solving, the PRI notes clearly show that discussion questions are always 
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followed by the ‘right answer.’22 The camps are spaces of incantation, rather than 
commoners’ probing of fine points of history. Ingando is not a space of contestation, but 
rather a space of imposed ‘sharing’ of ‘general knowledge’ and its ‘central truths’ (NTK June 
17 2005). 
 
 
5. Scripts’ Frontier: ‘Convergent Society’ and Unity as a ‘Minority’ Exercise 
 
Fellow-feeling…is important to the harmonious functioning of a polity, but it cannot 
be achieved by the simple imposition of a national ideal through exhortation or 
incantation.       
Crawford Young (1982:165) 
 
How, if at all, can a project of ‘unity’ succeed in today’s diverse Rwanda by fostering 
‘stability’ as a non-necessity to flee? This is a complex question. Promotion of national unity 
is not necessarily negative in itself and its most salient alternative, consociational power-
sharing, is not necessarily superior. However, as will be substantiated in more depth, de-
ethnicization as nation-building cannot proceed as is. The ‘overspilling’ abolition of division 
incurs high costs in terms of loss of diversity, remembrance, liberty and historicity. National 
unity is imposed, creating a convergent society where opposition and division do not 
disappear but merely ‘flee.’ The project as a whole is a ‘minority’ vision of the future. Lastly, 
the present section will suggest ‘ways out’ of the ‘convergent’ society. It will be argued that 
difference needs to be incorporated into a project of unity, and that the current overemphasis 
on ‘identity’ needs to give way to a preoccupation with state-building, which is just as much 
central to nation-building as its lack might be key to a nation’s unravelling.  
 
Consociational Power-Sharing: An Adequate Substitute? 
Proponents of consociational power sharing, the most famous being Arend Lijphart 
(1977), claim to have devised a democratic alternative for ‘deeply divided’ or ‘plural’ 
societies. In deeply divided societies, ‘political divisions follow very closely lines of 
objective social differentiation or “cleavages” that can be religious, ideological, linguistic, 
regional, cultural or ethnic in nature’ (Vandeginste and Huyse 2005:101). The consociational 
model has many varieties but they all concur that ‘pure simple majority rule’ should be 
abandoned, and instead elite cooperation, group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto 
should be the basis of stability23 (Lemarchand 2006:2).  
 
Besides the fact that the 1993 collapse of the Rwanda Arusha accords presents a text-
book case of an ‘ignominious failure’ of consociationalism (Lemarchand 2006), two powerful 
interconnected critiques can be launched based on the very presumptions of the theory. First, 
in societies where ‘deep divisions’ are broadly identifiable, consociationalism is said to 
further entrench them (Kebede 2001). Secondly, the theory does not suggest how to proceed 
in societies like Rwanda, which might not only be complexly altered as a result of multiple 
returns but where ‘group existence’, whether political, cultural or economic has effectively 
                                                 
22 e.g. ‘What strategy must be adopted in order to eradicate genocide ideology?’ Answer: ‘…banish separatist 
ideas, teach love, unity and reconciliation, all of this will help us overcome the country’s problems.’ (PRI 
2004:97)  
23 These are the four most important of the original eight features of non-majoritarian democracy as proposed by 
Lijphart (1977). 
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been prohibited along the lines of any division. What to do in such a society? Who would 
take on the job of instituting new divisions and thus perhaps resuscitating old ones, and how 
would they do so?  
 
The debate comes down to the constructivist versus primordial dispute on ‘ethnicity.’ 
Lijphart speaks of the ‘tenacity of primordial loyalties’ when he cautions against their 
eradication. Unsurprisingly, if ethnicity is an everpresent being, its denial might very well be 
unlikely to succeed, and might merely ‘stimulate segmental cohesion and inter-segmental 
violence’ (Lijphart 1977). In such cases, a political ‘unity’ as a complex cooperation of 
difference, might be the optimal solution. However, as countless scholars have asserted 
through its ‘historicization’, ethnicity in Rwanda is not of such an everpresent, tangible 
substance. Surely, as shown, Rwanda is a highly diverse society, where tensions exist and 
where opposition is not non-existent but merely suppressed. Diversity, tensions and 
opposition, however, do not have to add up to a ‘deeply divided’ society. They most 
definitely will if a call to power-sharing is made. Along the lines of Horowitz’s (1991) 
critique, power-sharing rewards politicians who mobilize support along ethnic lines. Political 
entrepreneurs have a further incentive to delineate such segments (niches) in an oligopolistic 
competition because they present a relatively easy mobilization platform (Snyder and 
Ballentine 1996).  
 
In today’s Rwanda, power-sharing might not be the optimal scenario. As Mamdani 
suggests, Bahutu and Batutsi should not be reproduced as dualities, but rather transcended 
(Mamdani 1996:30). He clearly operates on a simplistic and archaistic notion of a ‘bi-polar’ 
society but his general conjecture holds. ‘If people of different identities can communicate 
only through the recognition of their differences…how [can they] ever foster supra-ethnic or 
universalist attitudes?’ (Kebede 2001:280). We can attend to difference without instituting it 
as division/cleavage. The only question is how this should and should not be done. 
 
The ‘Overspilling’ of De-ethnicization  
De-ethnicization should not be the way forward in Rwanda. One of the key problems 
of the discourse and practice of de-ethnicization is that it leads to the overspilling of its 
categorical boundaries: What is targeted is not only ‘division’/‘divisionism’ but any possible 
division. As reflected in the 2003 Constitution, de-ethnicization set out to destroy not only 
ethnicity and regionalism but ‘other divisions’ which remain undefined. ‘Divisionism’ as a 
vaguely defined crime also threatens to subsume whatever is simply different and opposed. 
The internal logic of the discursive domain aids such overspilling. De-ethnicization is not 
open to critique because once such critique is voiced, it automatically attacks its fundamental 
tenet of unity. All critique of ‘unity’ is that which unity sets itself against – divisionism. 
‘Unity’ in Rwanda is a totalitarian unity which as a vision can hardly be politically contested.  
 
Counting Casualties: Diversity, Remembrance, Liberty and Historicity 
The ‘overspilling’ boundaries yet tight control of deviance create four broadly-
conceived ‘casualties’ of de-ethnicization: diversity, remembrance, liberty and historicity. 
Post-genocide societies do face complex rights’ trade-offs in a number of arenas such as 
freedom of speech and association. To deny such trade-offs is to fetter oneself to an illusion 
(Snyder and Ballentine). However, in Rwanda, the process of derogation is unbalanced. De-
ethnicization has to be rethought away from targeting all vaguely defined ‘division’ to merely 
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targeting division which is ‘unwilling to disarm’ (Mamdani 2001) (i.e. genocidal/extremist 
ideology). 
 
Many commentators mention that the national narrative should not suffocate ‘group 
cultures’ (Hodgkin and Montefiore 2005), Rwanda as clearly ‘multicultural’ (Mamdani 
2001:33-34). However, few people elaborate i) what these cultures are; and ii) how they 
might or might not have changed after the genocide. The problem is that while abolition of 
ethnicity might not make Rwanda less diverse in culture, the overspilling boundaries of de-
ethnicization and its ‘depth’ which suppresses difference all the way to the private sphere 
prevents those who traditionally lived at the margins of society from having their culture 
recognized and protected. The indigenous Twa, for instance, have been historically 
underrepresented in government, left out of discussions of genocide and continue to suffer 
discrimination (Forest Peoples Programme, CAURWA). We do not need ‘ethnicity’ to 
protect culture, but we need the recognition and valuation of diversity, which anyway might 
not cut across ‘ethnic lines’. 
 
It is further suggested that denial of ethnicity undermines reconciliation, because it 
prevents ‘remembrance’ which is important for healing. Some survivors of the genocide 
emphasize that they were attacked because they were Tutsi and to remove their ethnicity 
negates this horrific event. ‘Can one indeed speak of the genocide while denying the identity 
of the protagonists?’ (Ndereyehe 2006). Doesn’t this amount to la politique de l’autruche 
(‘ostrich politics’)? (ibid.) Remembrance is important for healing, but labels other than 
ethnicity can be (and have been) employed to denote differing experiences during genocide 
(‘survivor’, ‘perpetrator’, etc.). Employing alternative labels in fact might do more justice to 
the victims of the genocide which cut across ethnic lines and engulfed not only, first and 
foremost, Tutsis, but also moderate Hutus and Twas. Some criticize the current labelling as 
inadequate in this respect (Zorbas 2004). Particular care should be invested in constructing 
more nuanced identifications. But in the end, against the wishes of the government, aren’t 
these classifications just a more politically correct way of dividing the society, maintaining 
certain diversity as salient? 
 
De-ethnicization also restricts rights to freedom of speech and association. The 
Rwandan leadership argues in effect that ‘the transformation of existing states of mind is the 
prerequisite for the restoration of full civil and political rights’ (ICG 2002:1). While most 
constitutional democracies rule certain forms of expression out of bounds, making their 
difference from Rwanda one of degree rather than kind (Dorf 2004), the current ‘holding 
rights hostage’ to the transformation of identity is extreme.24  
 
Rights and freedoms should not be held hostage to the image of the worst to which 
they can lead. The ‘marketplace of ideas’ should be only minimally regulated. Genocidal or 
otherwise destructive ideology should be restricted in speech and association, rather than any 
ideology vested in ‘identity’ terms. Surely, Popper’s open society and Mill’s no-holds-barred 
debate weren’t conceived as free competition of diverse myths. The marketplace itself needs 
to be strengthened as the sudden liberalization of the press in newly democratizing countries 
has been shown to lead to outbursts of popular nationalism (Snyder and Ballentine 1996:2). 
                                                 
24 Taking another post-genocide society, Article 21 of Germany’s Constitution permits the banning of political 
parties that undermine the ‘free democratic basic order’, such as the Nazi party (Dorf 2004).The effectiveness of 
this prohibition is disputable as the operation of Neo-Nazi groups shows.  
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What is needed are not ‘many clamoring voices’ but a set of institutions and social norms that 
make pluralism ‘a civil process of reconciling of difference’ (ibid.:3).  
 
Finally, the complexity of history suffers as well. The Rwandan past does not easily 
support ‘division’ or ‘unity’ as absolute proclamations over a people. The focus should rather 
be on continuities and discontinuities in the evolution of a society and on the full spectrum of 
experience that might have converged one to and diverged one from specific others. ‘Unity’ 
can be worked towards without resorting to obscurantism, to exclusion of the differences and 
tensions of the past and the present. The history reproduced today is a ‘usable’ history 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), an ‘absolutist’ history’ which is imposed and unchallenged.  
 
The Major Problem: A Minority Vision of ‘Unity’? 
In restricting parties on ethnic (and more broadly ‘divisionist’ lines), the government 
is said to ‘engineer’ a consensual majoritarian democracy (Edozie 2007). What comes out is 
an RPF-led government ‘distorting the play of democracy and tending to transform Rwanda 
into an RPF state’ (Oomen 2006:19). After take-over, the RPF attempted to form an interim 
coalition government ‘in the spirit’ of the aborted Arusha process. Yet due to the funding 
structure, with RPF diaspora supporters as the main backers, ‘every act was undertaken with 
RPF personnel using RPF funds’ (Reed 1996:498). Hutus were always a part of the 
government, taking high posts and some even being part of the inner circle (e.g. Bizimungu). 
Yet over the years, many were forced or decided to resign (Vandeginste 1999). The RPF’s 
‘pinpointist’ proofs of ‘power’s diversity’ are today written off as mere tokenism. A broad-
based coalition was not established and any remaining talk about ‘sharing of power’ merely 
obscures the fact that Rwanda has become ‘for all intents and purposes, a single-party state’ 
(Lemarchand 2006:5).  
 
The minority ‘capture’ of the political domain represents the central problem in 
selling even a watered-down de-ethnicization project and explains the political-sceptical view 
of de-ethnicization as a way to mask the ‘Tutsi monopoly of military and political power’ 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006a:142; Reyntjens 2004:187), the ‘Tutsification of power’ and the 
nominal Hutu presence (Mamdani 2001:271), the ‘manipulation of ethnicity through “ethnic 
amnesia,” resulting in discrimination against the Hutu’ (Reyntjens 2004:38), ‘ethnocracy but 
with just enough power-sharing at the top to enlist a measure of Hutu collaboration’ 
(Lemarchand 1997:10).  
 
Such scholarly analyses suggest that i) ‘division’ has not ceased to structure cognition 
of social processes; and ii) a certain power-sharing is indeed expected between ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’ even if it does not label itself as such. The commentators fail on one important point, 
however: ‘RPF state’ does not equal Tutsi monopoly. As much as the elite in power are 
predominantly ‘Tutsis’, they are also predominantly ‘returnees’ and, more specifically, 
predominantly ‘Ugandan returnees’ supporting the RPF (which itself is fragmented). Today, 
there is no homogeneous ‘Tutsi’ category. Tensions exist between Tutsi returnees and 
survivors (Mgbako 2005), and within the Tutsi returnee community as well25 (HRW 2000). 
As Oomen (2006:19) writes, ‘military, bureaucratic and political power is consolidated in the 
hands of a minority of Tutsi linked to the RPF, of whom most returned to Rwanda in 1994 
                                                 
25 E.g. ‘Tutsi who returned from exile in Burundi or Congo have found their hopes for rapid success blocked by 
the predominance of those who returned from Uganda’ (HRW 2000). 
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after having been exiled in Uganda for decades [emphasis added]’. Reed (1996:498) further 
adds that ‘while the RPF maintained virtually no civilian administrative structures [in exile], 
nearly all the skilled manpower now available in Rwanda has come from the exiled 
community which gave birth to the movement.’ Pitsch-Santiago (2003) and Zorbas (2004) 
also relay the perception among the rest of the population that a sub-set of the Ugandan 
returnees are more politically connected and have more opportunities.  
 
What is at the core of the problem of ‘minority vision’? Is all this to suggest that the 
Ugandan Tutsis, being perceived as systematically more privileged than the rest, might 
perhaps represent one of the most serious cleavages/horizontal inequalities in Rwanda today 
and one of the biggest obstacles to the project of de-ethnicization? Such a proposition 
deserves close scrutiny. The nation-building project has been conceived and is executed by a 
minority government whose kernel hails from exile. Minority has to be here differentiated 
from elite: All state-to-nation nation-building projects are in a sense elite-driven and ‘top-
down’. Building of ‘unity’ would perhaps not emerge as a ‘grassroots’ exercise although it 
can be carried out in a participatory manner.  
 
The real problem rather seems to be that the current ‘single party’ rule seems 
conflated with a broad group of Rwandans. This perception/conflation is both ‘practically’ 
existent, yet theoretically ‘incorrect’ because it is only a certain network within the returnee 
sub-group that is relatively privileged. Whether concentration of power is ascribed to ‘Tutsi’ 
or ‘Ugandan Tutsi’ of course does matter, and this raises interesting questions as regards 
inconsistencies among scholars themselves. Yet the important lesson to draw here is that 
markers can lose their salience if people feel that they can access resources, including power, 
on an equal footing, or at least have the same chances to do so. In other words, the solution to 
‘authoritarianism’ might also connote the prevention of loading a certain social category with 
discriminatory meaning. 
 
A Way Out of ‘Convergent Society’: Incorporating Difference in a Project of ‘Unity’ 
In Rwanda, difference is suppressed and the public domain is a mere echo of the 
official discourse. The ingando ‘graduation ceremonies’, a public spectacle with press and 
officials attending, are a case in point. Participants perform traditional dances for the 
audience, give speeches about their happiness of being able to participate, and reiterate the 
inculcated lessons (Zorbas 2004:39; Standard April 6 2003). What we witness is a 
‘convergent’ society based on a mere appearance of concurring, manufactured by 
discouraging disagreement and a preference for a ‘low profile’ (Buckley-Zistel 2006b; Uvin 
1999; Minow and Chayes 2003). The lack of ‘voice’ (Hirschman 1970) or culture of silence 
(Longman 2004) signals merely pretend loyalty as a massive exit of ‘opinion’ occurs from 
public to private sphere or outside of the state.26 Even the history is a convergent one: All its 
parts hang together so as to allow a particular interpretation.  
 
Today, the Rwandan government tries to impose co-existence by pretending that there 
is no reason not to coexist. The government tries to attract to the pole of unity by prescribing 
its own vision of it and by forbidding anything that runs against. It thus creates a ‘false 
togetherness’ by swamping individuality and discouraging dissent. Yet unity should not 
                                                 
26 Approximately 20 opposition parties have been created in exile since the 1994 genocide (GLCSS 2006). They 
consider the nine Rwandan parties as mere ‘accomplices’ rather than opposition to the RPF. 
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connote ‘monolithicism’, but rather a certain ‘connectivity’ between people (Hodgkin and 
Montefiore 2005:20). In such a conceptualization, unity can be constituted while difference is 
recognized. In fact, the mutual recognition of difference, and mutual ‘recognition of the the 
other for his alterity, can also become a mark of common identity’ (Habermas and Derrida 
2003:1). Difference, which is undeniable and should not be denied, yet which we should 
refrain from ‘listing’/‘capturing’ as if it were a clearly recognizable and non-dynamic entity, 
can start to be democratized by us undermining the authority of the current ‘official’ 
narrative.  
 
It is crucial to find a way of talking about difference, and eliciting difference rather 
than asking for echoes. Without such interaction, grievances cannot be vented, needs cannot 
be fully addressed, and perhaps most importantly, ascriptions of ‘Tutsi’ or ‘Ugandan Tutsi’ to 
the concentration of power cannot be avoided. If a government is to address this, it has to 
show that ‘ethnicity’, and any other ‘division’, ‘do not matter’. This is practically 
unattainable unless i) the political process is pluralized; and simultaneously ii) supra-ethnic 
and universalist attitudes are promoted and incentivized in party formation. Rather than 
prescribing the ‘uncritical and idealized models of liberal democracy’ (Berman 1998:307), 
however, we should talk of ‘minimally-eclipsed’ plurality with the view that this is both a 
‘newly-democratizing’ (Snyder and Ballentine 1996) and a post-genocide society.  
 
All the above is a way of saying that ‘unity’ as reconceptualized cannot be built 
without building the state. Both power-sharing and de-ethnicization fail because they never 
escape gravitating around either ‘accommodation’ or ‘eradication’ of certain ‘identity(ies)’, 
which i) is insufficient in lessening their significance; and ii) treats difference as exclusionary 
and self-enclosed rather than allowing for a context where it would be ‘open to continuous 
challenge, negotiation and renewal’ (Norval, in Edozie 1999:12). State-building is not here to 
mean enhancement of a state’s centralized power and hegemony over society, but improving 
the state’s effectiveness in meeting expectations and promoting equality. The state needs to 
show that what it promises it promises to everyone, and that (almost) everyone has an equal 
right and chance to be defining his/her polity. While politicized ethnicity has led to conflict, 
precluding politicization of identity both through a concocted historical mythology and a 
strict punitive apparatus cannot foster ‘unity’, and in the long term, might not prevent another 
conflict. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
De-ethnicization is a modernist attempt lodged in ideals of social/future engineering, 
which simultaneously invokes traditionality in its support: It erects the future through a 
particular and particularly-read past. The discourse revolves around simplistic interwoven 
narratives of unity, and of dissolubility and expendability of difference. It wrongly concludes 
that an imposed and policed prohibition will lead to reconciliation and thus stability of non-
violence and of return. Such a mythology helps to perpetuate a paternalistic minority rule, 
while the only unity that ensues is one of forged concurrence. Government boasts people’s 
‘ownership’, allegedly reflected in their participation in various reconciliatory activities. Yet 
participation is often mandatory and dissent not welcome. All in all, the government’s battle 
with the nexus is not likely to succeed and should not be pursued due to its costs. The answer 
to the central paradox has not been found, partly because the paradox itself is wrongly 
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conceived. It attempts national unity by engineering loyalties, rather than by forming a more 
inclusionary state 
 
The weaving of textual webs in an attempt to arrest reality to a minority image of a 
future concerns all of us, particularly those who sustain the reconciliatory apparatus of post-
genocide Rwanda. Because while the government prides itself in reviving home-sourced 
solutions, and thus remaining autonomous and authentic, we also know that ‘never before 
was a process of justice driven so strongly from the outside’27 (Oomen 2005:887). Donors are 
especially at risk of reproducing the discourse and abetting its hidden agenda. The root of the 
problem is the lack of agencies’ own analysis. In documents, donors often expeditiously 
reproduce snippets of government descriptions and explanations, especially if it comes to a 
little-known subject such as ingando. Donors also sustain the machinery of script 
dissemination directly: UNHCR has provided tents for ingando participants (Internews 
February 3 2003), WFP financed and distributed food in the camps for at least four years 
(WFP February 4 2003), UNDP helps to finance NURC which lies behind all the 
reconciliatory ‘traditions’ (UNDP 2004b). But is this really the way forward as regards the 
return-reconciliation nexus? These questions need to be asked but cannot be answered 
without a fundamental rethinking of the complex relationship between ‘return’, conflict, and 
conflict ‘solutions.’ 
  
Given the limitations of the government’s approach to nation-building and the 
weaknesses of the most salient alternative, this study calls for a different approach. It 
attempts to reconceptualize unity as ‘connectivity’ which allows ‘difference’ to be expressed 
but not bound into ‘departmentalized’ ‘division’. The joint process of connectivity cum 
(carefully restricted) pluralization can perhaps be initiated through an alternative engagement 
with the past. If there is one ‘lesson of history’, then it is the one showing how history can be 
abused. Connectivity exists between all Rwandans in the basic sense that all have been 
subject to the ‘mythical authority.’ As such, each equally can work to reject it, by un-
constructing and destabilizing simplistic and instrumental narratives.  
 
Historicization exposes the mis-uses of the past most clearly. Subject to the temporal 
perspective, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nation’, and any other boundary separating an outside from an inside 
speak of a constant flux, uneasily both connecting and disconnecting from their precedent. 
The precariousness of ‘essentializing’ and ‘constructivizing’ revealed through the process of 
historicization does not delegitimize the very real/felt attachments that people might have. It 
might, however, serve to reject their abuse in service of a political goal. Opening ‘official 
history’ to careful analytical questioning can be a political feat, an empowering act, in the 
sense that it disperses the currently centralized ‘story-telling’ power and vests it more directly 
within the individual. ‘Past’ after all speaks a pluralist language: It can only be captured by 
approximating the never-expressable totality of fragmented and diverse takes.  
 
Many issues stand in need of further analysis, such as the manner in which nationalist 
scripts are negotiated (rejected/accepted/used) at the micro-level and the way in which they 
might affect or fail to affect the relations within communities. Much needs to be learnt as 
regards ingando itself, the full scope of its functionality and its effects. Donors’ own 
‘knowledge production systems’ need to be better understood, especially the ways in which 
                                                 
27 Over 100 projects were financed in the past decade and 80 percent of the budget of Ministry of Finance comes 
from outside (Oomen 2005). 
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they might be prone to reproduction of official discourse and thus susceptible to its 
manipulations. Most importantly, scholars need to carefully delve into the most difficult of 
questions, namely precisely what constitutes an optimal political solution in post-conflict 
contexts, why and in which circumstances. 
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APPENDIX – HISTORICAL TIMELINE: KEY DATES AND EVENTS 
 
Late 1800s  King Kigeri Rwabugiri establishes a unified polity with a centralized 
military structure. 
1890  Rwanda becomes part of German East Africa. 
1910 International borders are imposed. 
1916 Belgian forces occupy Rwanda. Indirect rule through Tutsi kings.  
1920s  Political unification. Rwanda’s central court annexes the north-west and 
other peripheral regions. 
1923 Belgium granted League of Nations mandate to govern Ruanda-Urundi.  
1946 Ruanda-Urundi becomes UN trust territory governed by Belgium. 
1933 Belgium introduces identity cards that ‘fix’ ethnic identity. 
1959 Hutu ‘Social Revolution.’ Tutsi King Kigeri V, together with tens of 
thousands of Tutsis, forced into exile in Uganda following inter-ethnic 
violence. 
1959-61 150,000 Tutsi flee to Congo, Uganda and Burundi. 
1962  Independence from Belgium. Southern Hutu rule with Grégoire Kayibanda 
as President of the ‘First Republic.’ 
1963-64  Tutsi exiles invade Bugasera. Pogroms follow and cause a further exodus of  
  Tutsi to South Kivu. 
1973 Military coup by northern Hutu. Habyarimana becomes president of ‘Second  
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  Republic.’ 
1989 Severe economic crisis sets in. 
1990 Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invades from Uganda. Low intensity 
warfare results. 
1993   President Habyarimana signs a power-sharing agreement with the Tutsis in 
the Tanzanian town of Arusha, ostensibly signalling the end of civil war. UN 
mission sent to monitor the peace agreement.  
1994  Habyarimana’s assassination triggers a genocide in which 800,000 Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu perish. RPF relaunches its offensive in July. RPF halts 
genocide and seizes power. 
1994-96  Refugee camps in Zaire fall under the control of the Hutu militias 
responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. 
1995  UN-led Operation Return peters out after initial successes. Government 
dismantles camps for IDPs. Massacre in Kibeho as last of the camps is being 
dismantled. 
1996  RPA moves into eastern Zaire to assist the Banyamulenge uprising, destroy 
the refugee camps and lead the campaign to topple Zaire’s President Mobutu 
Sese Seko. 
1997  Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels depose President Mobutu Sese Seko 
of Zaire. Laurent Kabila becomes president of Zaire, which is renamed the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
1998  Rwanda switches allegiance to support rebel forces trying to depose Kabila 
in the wake of the Congolese president's failure to expel extremist Hutu 
militias.  
2000  Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, resigns over differences 
regarding the composition of a new cabinet and after accusing parliament of 
targeting Hutu politicians in anti-corruption investigations. 
2001 December A new flag and national anthem are unveiled to try to promote ‘national 
unity and reconciliation’.  
2002 April  Former president Pasteur Bizimungu is arrested and faces trial on charges of 
illegal political activity and threats to state security.  
2002 July  Rwanda, DRC sign peace deal under which Rwanda will pull troops out of 
DRC and DRC will help disarm Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for killing 
Tutsi minority in 1994 genocide.  
2003 May  Voters back a draft constitution which bans the incitement of ethnic hatred.  
2003 October First multi-party parliamentary elections. President Kagame's Rwandan 
Patriotic Front wins absolute majority. EU observers say poll was marred by 
irregularities and fraud. 
2007 February  Some 8,000 prisoners accused of genocide are released. Some 60,000 
suspects have been freed since 2003 to ease prison overcrowding.  
